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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH LeROY PETERSON and
KATHRYN PEDERS·EN PETERSON,
Plaintiffs a;nd Respondents,
Case No. 7768
-vs.CUMORAH S. ELDREDGE
Defendant and A.ppella;nt,

RESPONDENT-S' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FAC-TS
We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in
the court below. It is felt necessary to present a more
complete and accurate statement of facts than appears
in the defendant's brief so the court may have this information before it.
On the northeast corner of 7th Avenue and D Street
in Salt Lake City is located a large house which faces
south onto 7th Avenue with 55 ft. frontage on 7th Avenue.
Back of the house is a triplex which faces west onto D
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Street. The two properties occupy 165 feet on D Street.
The house property was purchased by the parents of the
plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, in April, 1935. The
Petersons moved into and occupied the house as the
family home (R. 34). In 1938 the parents of the plaintiff,
Joseph LeRoy Peterson, purchased the triplex. R. 35.
The back yard of the house, including the strip in dispute
was all in lawn when the Peter sons purchased the house.
R. 70. They rehabilitated the lawn and during the threeyear interval from 1935 to 1938 and thereafter the Peterson family used and cared for, as the back yard of said
house, the ground to the edge of a sidewalk which runs
along the south side of the triplex and around to the
rear of the triplex. R. 17, 42. A wooden fence running
east and west, extending from the east property line a
short distance west so as p~artially to separate the two
properties existed when the house was purchased by the
PeteTsons in 1935. R. 18, 19. Sometime during the. period
of 1935 to 1937 the Petersons installed a sprinkling system in the back yard, which watered the back yard area
up to the edge of the sidewalk along the south side of
the triplex. R. 18. The plaintiff, J ose·ph LeRoy Peterson,
lived in the large house from July, 1935, until February,
1937, and the plaintiff, Kathryn Pedersen Peterson, was
a frequent visitor at the home during this same period
of time. Both of the-m became acquainted with the yard
as it existed at that time and as is described herein.
In 1944 the plaintiffs purchased the house and triplex
from the mother of the plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson,
and moved into the house as their family home. The
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triplex was rented as incon1e property. Also in 1944,
plaintiffs built a ne'v fence running from east to west
completely ·separating the house from the triplex and
continuing so as to enclose the back yard 'of the house.
The new fence was placed imm-ediately south of the sidewalk which. runs along the south end of the triplex· and in
line with the old section of wooden fence which was replaced by the n.ew fence. R. 19-22, 43, 44. The fence was
constructed of 6 ft. "T" iron posts extending 4% ft. out
of the ground with wire stock fencing 4 ft. high fastened
to the posts. R. 22. After that it was necessary to go
around the fence to get from the· house to the triplex.·
On February 23, 1949, plaintiff, Kathryn Pedersen
Peterson, listed the house ·and triplex for sale separately
with Inland Realtors. R. 46. The listing cards were made
out by the· realty co1npany salesman, who obtained information from the plaintiff, l(athryn Pedersen Peterson.
These listing cards indicated the house p.rop·erty as· being
approximately 80 ft. along D Street and 60· fe·et along
7th Avenue and the triplex as having approximately
50 feet frontage along D Street and a depth o[ approximately 60 feet. The defendant inspected the triplex
property on two occasions and on March 5, 1949, signed
an earnest money agreement 'vhich agreement contained
no mention of the size of the lot. R. 62, Ex. C: ·The 4 ft.
fence separating the properties was there when she made
her inspections and she saw it. R. 58, 59. The fence at
that time completely separated the properties except that
at the extreme east end of the fence the fencing had been
pushed or tramped down so that it was easy to get across
the fence at that point.
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Later in March, 1949, plaintiffs as sellers, and defendant as buyer, executed the uniform real estate contract which is the subject of this action. Ex. 1. When
the defendant purchased the triplex she had not considered the size of the lot at all. R. 60, 63. She was interested in the size of the rooms, and when she signed the
real estate contract was the first time she saw any legal
description of the p·roperty, and even at that time she did
not pay any attention to the frontage she was buying.
R. 62, 63. Defendant had no reason to believe her property extended south of the fence because it had been
represented to her otherwise. R. 63. Sometime in June,
1949, defendant asked the plaintiffs to sell her three or
more feet south of the fence but they declined. R. 61.
In January, 1951, ahnost two years after executing the
contract, defendant first learned that the fence line did
not correspond with the property as described in the
contract. R. 60. It was only after making this discovery
that the defendant ever made any claim to the property
south of the fence. R. 64. Plaintiffs, during the smnmers
of 1949 and 1950, used ·as a back yard for lawn and
flowers the area up the south side of the wire fence.
Vines and morning-glories planted by the plaintiffs
along the fence covered most of the fence area. R. 26,
27, 45. Defendant at no time objected to plaintiffs' use
of the yard. R. 2'7, 62. Plaintiffs first learned the description in the contract and the fence line did not correspond
about January 19, 1951, which was subsequent to defendant's discovery of this fact. R. 23, 24, 47. The real estate
contract, in fact, described a strip 11 feet 9 inehes 'vide.
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south of the fence running from the east to the west
property lines. R. 32.
Plaintiffs were in Blanding, Utah, when they signed
the real estate contract which was prepared by the
Brockbank Real Estate Company, which company made
the sale. The description used in the contract was taken
from an abstract of the triplex property. R. 36, 76.
Plaintiffs have four children and their house is large.
The only part of the yard which is level and a safe place
for the children to play, and not bordered by a high
retaining wall, is the back yard of the house, including
the strip in dispute. To give the defendant this 11 ft.
9 in. strip leaves the house with yirtually no back yard
and without a safe area for the children to play. R. 32,
33, 51.
STATE~IENT OF POINT'S
POINT I. THE MISTAKE OF FACT WAS MUTUAL.
BOTH PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT, THE
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION, UNDER THE BELIEF THAT
THE PROPERTY PLAINTIFFS WERE SELLING AND DEFENDANT WAS BUYING WAS THE TRIPLEX WITH THE
GROUND NORTH OF THE FENCE WHICH SEPARATED
THE HOUSE FROM THE TRIPLEX.
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, OR, IF THEY
WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT DID
NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS EXCUSABLE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE MISTAKE OF FACT WAS MUTUAL.
BOTH PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT, THE
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION, UNDER THE BELIEF THAT
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THE PROPERTY PLAINTIFFS WERE SELLING AND DEFENDANT WAS BUYING WAS THE TRIPLEX WITH THE
GROUND NORTH OF THE FENCE WHICH SEPARATED
THE HOUSE FROM THE TRIPLEX.

In the brief of the defendant, six statements of error
are assigned and argued separately. Plaintiffs will answer defendant's Points One to Five under Point I in
this brief.
Plaintiffs agree with defendant that "the law is well
settled in this jurisdiction that a written contract will be
reformed to express the real intention of the parties only
where proof of the mistake is clear, definite and convincing and where the party seeking reformation is not guilty
of negligence in drawing .the contract nor of laches in
making timely ap-plication for the reformation." George
v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Ut. 460, 256 P. 400.
Defendant makes no claim that plaintiffs were guilty of
laches in making application for the reformation, therefore, the court need consider here the questions of (1)
whether the mistake was mutual and the proof thereof
is clear, definite and convincing, and (2) whether plaintiffs were guilty of negligence in the execution of the
contract.
Plaintiffs contend earnestly that the mistake was
mutual and that the proof of the mistake is clear, definite
and convincing.
Both plaintiffs testified that when they executed the
con tract they in tended to sell . only the property north
of the fence. R. 36, 46, 47. Plaintiffs first learned that
the property described in the contract did not correspond
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'vith the fence line in January, 1951. The fence completely separating the house and triplex was standing
\vhen the eontract \vas executed by the parties in March
of 19-±9. Throughout the smnmers of 1949 and 1950
plaintiffs eontinued to use and occupy all the ground up
to the fence as they had done in the past. They cared for
law·n in that area and planted and cared for fio,vers in
a garden in said area. A sprinkling system, which
had been installed sometin1e from 1935 to 1937, which
watered all the ground up to the fence was continued
1n use.
\Vhen the defendant, soon after t!1e execution of the
contract, asked plaintiffs to sell her three or n1ore feet
south of the fence, plaintiffs declined and told her they
did not have enough back yard as it was. Certainly
plaintiffs' use and care of all of the ground south of the
fence during 1949 and 1950 and their refusal to sell any
of that ground to the defendant establishes beyond question that they intended in the real estate contract to sell
the defendant only the property north of the fence.
So much for what the plaintiffs intended. Now let
us consider the defendant's intention when she executed
the contract. Defendant inspected the triplex property
twice before executing ·the earnest money agreement,
which preceded the signing of the uniform real estate
contract. The 4 ft. wire fence on steel poles separating
the house fron1 the triplex was standing whe,n defendant
inspected the triplex, and she saw that fence. R. 58, 59.
Defendant signed the earnest money agree1nent early in
1\farch, 1949. This agreement contains no mention of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
the size of the lot. R. 62, Ex. C. Defendant's testimony
is that when she purchased the triplex she hadn't considered the size of the lot at all. R. 60, 63. That she
was interested in the size of the ·rooms and that the first
time she saw any legal description of the property was
when she signed the re.al estate· contract and even at that
·time she did not pay any attention to the frontage she
was buying. R. 62, 63. Her testimony further is that
she had no reason to believe her property extended south
of the fence because it had been represented to her otherwise. R. 63. Further, defendant testified that it was not
until January, 1951, that she discovered the contract
included land south of the fence. R. 60. And that it was
not until after she made this discovery that she ever
1nade any claim for any property south of the fence.
R. 64. In approximately June of 1949, which was not
more than three months after the execution of the contract and about two months after defendant moved into
the triplex, she asked plaintiffs to sell her three to six
feet south of the fence. R. 28, 29, 78. Certainly the
defendant would not have attempted to purchase· any of
this ground from the plaintiffs if she believed she was
already purchasing it under contract. At no time during
the summers of 1949 or 1950 did defendant object to
plaintiffs' use and care of all of the p·roperty south of
the fence. R. 27.
Certainly the defendant cannot no'v be heard to say
in oppositon to all this conclusive evidence that when
she executed the re-al estate contract she believed she
was buying. land south of the fence or that the fence did
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